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McDaniels v. District of Columbia
Dep't of Employment Servs.:
THE D.C. COURT OF APPEALS
HOLDS THAT WORKERS~
COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS
ARE ENTITLED TO THE LESSER
OF 66%% OF AVERAGE WEEKLY
WAGES OR 80% OF SPENDABLE
EARNINGS.
In McDaniels v. Department of Employment Services, 512 A.2d 990 (1986), the
D.C. Court of Appeals held, pursuant to
the D.C. Workers' Compensation Act,
D. C. Code Ann. § 36-308 (1986), (hereinafter 36-308) that the petitioners in the
cast: at bar were entitled to compensation
at the lesser of 66 213% of their average
weekly earnings or 80% of their spendable
earnings. In so holding, the court affirmed
the D.C. Department of Employment Service's (hereinafter referred to as D.O.E.S.)
interpretation of 36-308.
In McDaniels, the petitioners, Fletcher
McDaniels and Jeffrey Hightower, challenged the D.O.E.S. interpretation of
36-308. The D.O.E.S. determined that the
petitioners were entitled to 80% of their
spendable earnings. The petitioners' appealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals from
the D.O.E.S. determination.
On appeal, petitioner McDaniels, who
was permanently disabled, contended that
the first two sentences of 36-308(e) were
contradictory and also that the D.O.E.S. interpretation of 36-308(e) was contradictory
with 36-308(A)(1) and 36-308(A)(3). McDaniels further alleged that 36-308(A}(1)
could be subject to an interpretation in
which he would receive 66 213% of his average weekly earnings, which was higher than
80% of his spendable earnings. Petitioner
Hightower, who also was permanently partially disabled, asserted that 36-308 guaranteed him 66 213% of his weekly wages and
that the 80% provision is only applicable
to claimants suffering from temporary
total disability.
Before addressing the petitioners arguments, the court of appeals cited case law
that established that when an agency such
as the D.O.E.S. has the power to effectuate
a statute's provisions, the court must give
deference to the agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute. Hughes v. D. C.
Dep't of Employment Services, 498 A.2d
567 (D.C. 1985); Thomas v. D. C. Dep't of
Labor, 409 A.2d 164 (D.C. 1979). In determining whether the D.O.E.S. made a
reasonable interpretation of 36-308, the
court of appeals had to ascertain whether
the statutory language was clear and unambiguous. If the statute's language is
clear and unambiguous the court must give
effect to the plain meaning of the statute.

Office of Peoples Counsel v. Public Service
Commission, 477 A.2d lO79 (D.C. 1984).
The court then examined the relevant sections of 36-308, which follow:
§ 36-308. Compensation for disability.
(a) Compensation for disability shall
be paid to the employee as follows.
(1) In case of total disability adjudged to be permanent, sixtysix and two thirds percent of the
employee's average weekly wages
shall be paid to the employee during the continuance thereof . ..
(2) In case of disability total in
character but temporary in quality, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the employee's average
weekly wages shall be paid to
the employee during the continuance thereof;
(3) In case of disability partial in
character but permanent in quality, the compensation shall be
sixty-six and two-thirds percent
of the employee's average weekly
wages which shall be in addition
to compensation for temporary
total disability or temporary partial disabililY paid in accordance with paragraph (2) or (4)
of this subsection respectively,
and shall be paid to the employee, as follows
(e) For the purpose of this chapter,
payment of benefits at the rate of 80
percent of the spendable earnings of
an employee shall be deemed to be
not less than sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of such employee's average
weekly wage. In all cases, payment
of benefits shall be at the lesser of
sixty-six and two-thirds percent of
the employee's average weekly wage
or 80 percent of spendable earnings. Spendable earnings shall be
the employee's gross average weekly
wage reduced by an amount determined to reflect amounts which would
be withheld from such wage under
Federal and state or District of Columbia income tax laws, and under
Subchapter IV of Chapter 21 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(relating to social security taxes).
In all cases, it is to be assumed that
the amount withheld would be determined on the basis ofanticipated
liability of such employee for tax
for the taxable year in which such
payments are made without regard
to any itemized deductions but
taking into account the maximum number of personal exemp-

tion deductions allowable. (emphasis added).
The court determined that the language
in the second sentence of36-308(e) which
provided "that beneficiaries shall receive
the lessor of 66 213 percent of their average
weekly wages or 80 percent of their spendable earnings" was clear and unambiguous.
The court stated that unless the petitioners
established that the second sentence was
not controlling in their respective cases,
the D.O.E.S. determination that the petitioners were entitled to 80% of their spendable earnings would be affirmed.
In rejecting the petitioners' initial argument that the first two sentences of36-30B(e)
are contradictory, the court held that the
first sentence "did not change the calculation specified by the second sentence, but
only the legal significance to be attached to
a calculation resulting in the payment of
less than 66 213 percent of their average
weekly wage." McDaniels, 512 A.2d at
992. Petitioners also argued that the language in 36-308(A)(1) and 36-308(A}(3),
which provides for benefits equal to 66213%
of average weekly wages to persons who
are on total permanent disability and partial permanent disability is inconsistent
with the 80% provision in 36-308(e). Acknowledging an inconsistency in the language, the court determined that the inconsistency was merely superficial and
that when the statute was construed with
"well settled" principles, the ambiguity in
36-308's meaning was abrogated.
The court of appeals further reconciled
the inconsistency by determining that the
D.C. Council drafted 36-308(e) to cover
all subsections of the statute rather than repeat the same language in each subsection
of 36-308. Therefore the first sentence of
36-308(e) "acted as a bridge between the
calculation formula of 36-308(e) and the
placemarkers in 36-308(A) assuring against
subsequent uncertainty as to their interrelationship". ld. at 993. In refuting the petitioners' alternative argument that the 80%
provision applies only to temporarily totally disabled claimants, the court held
that the petitioners failed to read critical
language in 36-308(e) which provides that
80% of a claimant's spendable earnings
would be awarded in all cases where the
figure is less than 66 213% of the claimant's
average weekly wage. The court stated
that "all cases" means that the 800/0 provision applies to all categories of workers'
compensation claimants.
The court then rejected the petitioners
contention that the first sentence of36-30B(e)
entitles the claimant to receive the greater
of 66 213% of their average weekly wage
or 80% of their spendable earnings. The
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court tersely stated that the sentence lacked
any indicia that the higher sum would be
awarded.
-- -- The court substantiated their construction of the statute by examining the legislative history behind 36-308. The court
found the following reasons to include the
80% provision in the statute: (1) cost saving; (2) prevention of disability recipients'
receipt of more after tax income than if
they worked; and (3) the preservation of
the work incentive. Report of the D. C. City
Council Committee on Housing and Economic Development on Bill 3-106, 01/08/80,
pp. 4, 16-17. The court concluded that the
petitioners failed to demonstrate why these
goals were not attained by applying the
80% provision to them and others in their
disability categories.
The McDaniel court clarifies the meaning of36-308. It is now clear that claimants
are entitled to the lesser of 80% of their
spendable earnings or 66 213% of their average weekly wage. The court's strict interpretation of 36-308 narrows the avenue
of statutory attack available to workers'
compensation claimants. Future attack on
36-308 will be best pursued through the
legislative process.
-Avery Berdit

Staley 'D. Board of Education of
Washington County: ATTORNEY'S
FEES ALLOWED EVEN THOUGH
AMOUNT PAID IN WORKERS'
COMPENSATION CLAIM
EXCEEDED TOTAL SUM DUE
UNDER A MODIFIED AWARD.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Staley v. Board of Education of Washington
County, 308 Md. 42, 517 A.2d 349 (1986)
held that an employer and its insurer
were required to pay legal fees to a workers' compensation claimant's attorney even
though the amount already paid to the
claimant exceeded the total amount due
under a modified award. In so holding, the
court of appeals reversed the court of special appeals and affirmed the circuit court
ruling.
Claimant Joy M. Renehan Staley, a
school teacher, fractured her hip in the
course of her employment. The Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) determined that Ms. Staley suffered
a 55% permanent partial disability and
set compensation benefits accordingly.
Ms. Staley's employer and the insurer appealed the Commission's order to the Circuit Court of Maryland for Washington
County. There the circuit court deter24- The Law Forum/Winter, 1987

mined that the Commission had erred and
ruled that Ms. Staley suffered only a 35%
permanent partial disability. The court
therein modified her award commensurately.
While the appeal to the circuit court was
in progress, the employer had been paying
disability benefits at the rate set for 55%
disability. By the time Ms. Staley's award
was modified by the circuit court, the accumulated amount already paid to her was
$9,000 higher than the total modified
amount. In addition, claimant's attorney
had properly filed for, and had been approved by the Commission, attorney's fees
at an amount commensurate to the 55%
disability rate. When the claimant's disability award was modified, claimant's
attorney filed a new petition and the Commission reduced the attorney's fees commensurate to the modified award. Both
Commission approvals called for the attorney's fees to be paid out of the final
weeks of claimant's disability payments.
When Ms. Staley's attorney was not paid
his legal fees, he first filed issues with the
Commission to require the employer to
pay the awarded attorney's fees. After the
attorney (again) was found to be entitled to
his fees Ms. Staley's employer appealed
this order to the circuit court where the
Commission's decision was upheld. The
employer then appealed to the court of
special appeals. The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court basing their
decision on their belief that there were no
reserve funds remaining for the benefit of
the attorney. The court of appeals then
granted certiorari.
In analyzing the issue herein, the court
of appeals looked to two specific statutes
under Maryland law. Judge Couch, writing
for the majority, concluded that under
Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 57 (1985) and
COMAR 14.19.01.21F(Rule21 F), when
attorney's fees are approved by the Commission, a lien is placed upon the compensation award in the amount approved.
When a fee petition is filed by an attorney,
the employer and its insurer are put on notice, and must put in escrow, the amount
requested in the petition until the Commission approves the fee request. See
Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 57 (1985) and
COMAR 14.09.01.21F. The escrow account and the lien on the funds therein remain in existence until the attorney receives his due compensation. 308 Md. at
48, 517 A.2d at 352, citing Hoffman v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 232
Md. 51, 55-56, 191 A.2d 575, 577-79
(1962).
After looking at the two statutes, the
court concluded that on the date of filing
of the attorney's fee petition, the employer

and its insurer were put on notice to segregate the amount requested from claimant's
award and place it into escrow. Once the
attorney's fees were approved by the Commission, the lien on that approved amount
materialized. The escrow amount and the
lien were not extinguished when the circuit court modified claimant's award. The
only effect of the Commission's subsequent
modified fee award was to change the sum
held in escrow to the modified amount. Id.
at 49, 517 A.2d at 352.
The court herein made it clear that this
procedure for attorney's fees is followed
even in the event that there is an overpayment in compensation. The court relied
on the reasoning in Hoffman, supra. There,
the Commission awarded compensation that
was subsequently reduced on appeal. As in
the case herein, the total modified award
was less than what the insurer had already
paid out. But in Hoffman, money had been
put in escrow to satisfy attorney's fees. The
insurer therein refused to pay attorney's
fees arguing that when the court reduced
the award, there was no money left upon
which a lien could attach. In rejecting the
insurer's contention, the court of appeals
therein wrote that "an insurance carrier
cannot defeat an attorney's statutory lien
by applying funds held in escrow to satisfy
an overpayment to a claimant." Hoffman,
232 Md. at 55-56, 191 A.2d at 587 .. Judge
Couch concluded that Hoffman applies
equally as well in this case.
The court in Staley also analyzed the
court of special appeals' rationale for their
reversal. The court of special appeals reasoned that funds for satisfaction of attorney's fees were accumulated only from
the final weeks of compensation due a
claimant. Because there was an overpayment here, the appellees were no longer
able to reserve funds to pay the attorney.
The court of appeals rejected this rationale
on two grounds. First, the lower court's
reasoning ignores the "clear requirement
of Rule 21 F that compensation funds must
be placed in an escrow account no later
than at the time the attorney files his fee
petition. It is simply incorrect to conclude
that the escrow account remains empty until one reaches the final weeks of compensation." 308 Md. at 51,517 A.2d at 353.
Second, and "more fundamentally," Judge
Couch argued, "the intermediate appellate
court's approach would encourage those in
appellee's position to postpone establishing an escrow account and placing compensation funds therein until after an
appeal of the claimant's award has been
decided." Id. at 52, 517 A.2d at 353-54.
The court herein was quick to point out
that this decision is in no way inconsistent
with Feissner v. Prince George's County,

